Supreme Court Strikes Down Portions of Employment Insurance Act
Promoting hatred is a criminal offence under the hate propaganda sections of Canada’s Criminal Code (318 through 320.1).[1] Allegations made under those sections are investigated by police officers and prosecuted by Crown prosecutors. This means that guilt in those cases must be proven at a standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Complaints about discrimination can also be made to the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) under section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA).[2] Complaints about discrimination under theCanadian Human Rights Act must allege breaches of section 2 of that Act, which forbids:
On June 13, 2008, the Energy and Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) was given Notice of a Constitutional Question filed by the Métis Nation of Alberta (“MNA”).[1] The question was raised pursuant to Section 12 of the Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act (“APJA”)[2] and was stated in the following terms:
Has the Crown discharged its duty to consult the MNA with respect to potential infringements of Aboriginal rights protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982[3] which may arise if Application No. 1490956 to the ERCB is granted approval for construction and operation of the proposed Fort Hills Sturgeon Upgrader and associated infrastructure in Sturgeon County?
An exotic dancer has filed a discrimination complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal. Kim Ouwroulis, 44, complained that the strip club she worked at fired her due to her age. She had worked there 4 years before being fired. Ms. Ouwroulis was told by the owner of the strip club that “they were going in a new direction with younger girls.”[1] She has since found work at a rival establishment.
Under the Ontario Human Rights Code, age discrimination is prohibited. Section 5(1) states that:
Three First Nations in Saskatchewan have received land settlements amounting to approximately $80 million. The Cote, Keeseekose, and Key bands in Saskatchewan will receive $80 million from the federal government in exchange for lands taken from them by the government at the turn of the 19th century. 6 percent of the settlement deal will go towards negotiation and research costs. Each of the bands’ collective 5,000 off- and on-reserve members will receive approximately $1,500. The bulk of the settlement, however, will go to land purchases and other investments. Band leaders will travel among Aboriginal communities to gain ideas on how to invest the bulk of the settlement, including purchasing some of the original land taken from them.
The lands taken from the bands total 12,800 acres and are located in eastern Saskatchewan. The lands, known as the Pelly Haylands, were originally set aside by the federal government to be used as a reserve in 1893. However, they were taken from the bands in 1898 and 1905. In reaching the settlement, the federal government has admitted it breached a lawful obligation in taking away the lands. The payout would have likely occurred earlier, had there not been a recently dismissed lawsuit on the settlement. Currently, there are 70 outstanding First Nations land claims in Saskatchewan.
Sources
Jason Warick, “$80 million Saskatchewan land settlement goes to 3 native bands” Edmonton Journal (3 November 2008).
Canadian Press, “Three Sask. reserves celebrate land claim settlement worth $80 million” (6 November 2008).
“Fort Pelly Agency (Cote, Keeseekoose and Key First Nations) [Pelly Haylands]” Indian Claims Commission(11 October 2006).
The federal government is seeking to slow down the growth of payments under Canada’s equalization program. Finance Minister Jim Flaherty recently stated that equalization has of late been growing at an unsustainable 15 percent per year, saying “We need to curtail the growth, limit the growth of equalization over time ... because it's not sustainable over time.”[1] Flaherty reiterated that the federal government is seeking to set caps on equalization payments and not change the formula for determining such payments. The growth of payments would be tied to the GDP growth of the province.[2]
The news comes at the same time as it was announced that Ontario will receive equalization payments as a “have not” province for the first time in the history of the equalization program.[3] Next year, Ontario is expected to receive $347 million of the $14 billion program.
Equalization is a federal government program, established in the 1950’s, which attempts to “equalize” disparities among provincial treasuries. The principles underlying the program are recognized in section 36(2) the Constitution Act, 1982. The program’s purpose is to maintain satisfactory levels of provincial government public services in poorer provinces. Provinces qualify for payments when they fall below a national standard of fiscal well being. Québec currently receives over $8 billion in payments. Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan, and for the first time Newfoundland and Labrador, are currently considered too wealthy to receive any equalization payments.
[1]Reuters, “Canada to limit growth of payments to provinces”(30 October 2008).
[2]Lee Greenberg, “Ontario officially a 'have-not', to get $337M in equalization”Ottawa Citizen (4 November 2008).
[3]Ibid.
The Youth Criminal Justice Act
In 1908, the Juvenile Delinquents Act determined that young people would be charged with “delinquency” rather than specific criminal offences.[1]Youth were treated much like adults under this regime. Judges based their discretionary sentencing decisions on the likelihood of rehabilitation.[2] In 1984, the Young Offenders Act (YOA) was introduced in order to allow youth to be charged with specific offences.[3] The change was intended to instill a greater sense of responsibility in young offenders. However, the new Act was also subject to wide-ranging criticism[4] for failing to give appropriate recognition to victims, for lacking coherent principles of youth justice in Canada, for failing to provide consistent and fair sentences, and for burdening the courts unnecessarily. These considerations were eventually taken into account by the federal government and in 2003, the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) came into force.[5] Its Declaration of Principles states that the main goals of the YCJA are to rehabilitate youth, to provide meaningful consequences and, thereby, to promote enduring protection of the public.
There are a number of important elements of the Act:[6]
The Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. D.B.[7]
In May 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that youth charged with serious offences will no longer bear the burden of having to prove that they should be sentenced as youth.[8] It will now be up to the Crown to prove that the youth ought to be sentenced as an adult.
The YCJA provides that a person, over the age of 14, can be sentenced either as an adult or a youth if they have committed a crime such as murder, aggravated sexual assault, or manslaughter.[9] The implications can be dramatic because the maximum youth sentence for first-degree murder is 10 years, while, for an adult, the sentence would be life with no possibility of parole for 25 years.[10]
The majority found that these provisions of the YCJA breach section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[11] Section 7 states:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.[12]
Justice Rosalie Abella, on behalf of a 5-4 majority, explained that it is a principle of fundamental justice that young people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability flowing from the fact that, “because of their age, they have heightened vulnerability, less maturity and a reduced capacity for moral judgment.”[13] The majority suggested that the international community’s support for this decision is evident in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.[14] The dissenting judges argued that there is no societal consensus that the presumption in question forms a principle of fundamental justice.[15]
The Court also struck down a provision that requires young offenders, who have been given adult sentences, to demonstrate that their identities should continue to be protected by a publication ban.[16] The publication ban, Justice Abella explained, is part of the sentence.[17] To remove it adds to the severity of the sentence because the degree of psychological and social pressure on the person escalates as a result. Since the onus is on the Crown to prove that an adult sentence is necessary, the majority argued that the Crown should have to prove that the publication ban, and the added stresses it brings, should be added to the sentence.[18]
On this point, the dissenting judgment also disagreed, saying that the conclusion arrived at by Parliament was a legitimate exercise in balancing competing societal interests.[19] The dissent also found that because the harm is not state induced, the Charter should not apply here. Justice Rothstein stated that, in the case at bar, “there is no state action: the stigma and labelling that may result from release of the young offender’s identity are a product of media coverage and society’s reaction to young offenders and to the crimes they commit.”[20]
Harper Government on Crime and Changes to the YCJA
Crime
In late September 2008, Stephen Harper announced that, if re-elected, his government would define 30 offences that could not result in house arrest.[21] These include serious property crimes, invading a home, trafficking of illicit substances, kidnapping and offences that involve weapons. Since the election, the Liberals, NDP and Bloc Québécois have worked hard to lessen the stringency of this key bill.[22] They agreed that sexual and violent offences could not be punishable through house arrest, but that car theft and breaking and entering should be.[23] In an attempt to assuage those who see them as “soft on crime,” the Liberals have adopted a new slogan to counter the Conservative’s monopoly on a “tough on crime”[24] agenda. For the Liberals, being “smart on crime” suggests making laws that avoid court challenges. However, they have also agreed to bring some other, less pivotal, bills into law.[25] One is in relation to existing DNA data banks of convicted offenders. Another deals with criminal court procedures. Somewhat more dramatically, the Liberals have agreed to speed up the introduction of street-racing legislation, and a bill that could raise the age of sexual consent from 14 to 16.
Despite the Supreme Court decision in May, Harper has pledged to overhaul the YCJA, allowing for adult sentences on some occasions and removing publication bans.[26] Additionally, he hopes to raise the maximum terms for youth sentences. Legal experts have suggested these proposals have already been shut down by the Supreme Court’s decision in May.[27] The fact that the Court struck down the requirement that the burden of proof is on youth to demonstrate that they should not be sentenced as adults suggests that automatic sentences, with no judicial discretion, would also be struck down.[28] Harper said Justice Department officials advised the proposal would not conflict with constitutional principles.[29]
Federalism
In the United States, criminal law is under state jurisdiction.[30] For instance, in Texas murder is punishable by death, but this is not the case in all states.[31] In Canada, however, criminal law falls under federal jurisdiction. Some have complained that the Harper government’s position on youth justice allows provinces too much control over criminal law matters, which adds a patch-work quality to the quilt of justice.[32]
In most of Canada, the new sentences would be applied to youth over the age of fourteen. However, the Harper strategy allows provinces to choose whether they would like to see a higher age threshold.[33] Harper’s communications director, Kory Teneycke, has referred to this strategy as contributing to the federal governments “open federalism”[34] agenda. The official tenets of open federalism for this government include:[35]
The catalyst for allowing discrepancies among provinces has been Québec’s interest in having the threshold set at 16 years of age.[36]
It should be noted that the Conservatives were not the first to consider differential sentencing rules among provinces.[37] In 2002, when the YCJA passed, the provinces were given the power to opt-out of the reverse-onus provisions. Two provinces, Québec and Newfoundland and Labrador, chose not to implement the reverse onus.
[1] CBC News, “Youth Criminal Justice Act: Changing the law on young criminals” CBC News (23 June 2006).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] R. v. D.B., 2008 SCC 25 (CanLII).
[8] Ibid. at para. 95.
[9] Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C., 2002, c. 1, s. 72(2), 61 and 62.
[10] Kirk Makin, “Crown on hook over sentencing youths” The Globe and Mail (16 May 2008).
[11] Supra note 7 at para. 95.
[12] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 7.
[13] Supra note 7 at para. 41.
[14] Ibid. at para. 60.
[15] Ibid. at para. 131.
[16] Ibid. at para. 95.
[17] Ibid. at para. 87.
[18] Ibid. at para. 94.
[19] Ibid. at para. 107.
[20] Ibid. at para. 178.
[21] “Harper sees crime issues as political winner” CTV.ca (28 October 2008).
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Campbell Clark, Caroline Alphonso and Les Perreaux, “Harper pitches two-tier justice plan” The Globe and Mail (22 September 2008).
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Orillia Today Com, “Youth Crime” Orillia Today Com (30 September 2008).
[31] Ibid.
[32] The Globe and Mail, “Tougher Justice, Patchwork Nation” The Globe and Mail (23 September 2008).
[33] Supra note 21.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Office of the Prime Minister, “Prime Minister Promotes Open Federalism” (21 April 2006), online: Office of the Prime Minister.
[36] Supra note 21.
[37] Supra note 27.
On October 30, 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal in Toronto Police Association v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.[1] In 2001, an RCMP-led Special Task Force began to investigate allegations made against certain members of the Toronto Police Service (TPS).[2] The task force obtained a number of search warrants and an authorization to set up a wire tap. The applications for the warrants and authorization contained the names of all of the officers to be investigated. Only one officer was charged as the result of the investigation.
The Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) heard arguments in Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, et al on October 12, 2008. A decision is pending. The case arose after the Alberta government changed its driver’s licence regulations to require that individuals have their photo appear on their licence. The Hutterites objected to the regulations on religious grounds, winning at both the trial and appeal levels.
On October 14, 2008 Judge Ross issued reasons for judgment in Victoria (City) v. Adams.[1] Homeless people had been setting up “tent cities” in Victoria’s city parks. In response, the City brought in bylaws which had the effect of banning overnight camping in those parks. People were allowed to sleep in the parks, but they could not shelter themselves. Judge Ross ruled that the bylaws were “of no force and effect insofar and only insofar as they apply to prevent homeless people from erecting temporary shelter.”[2]
The City had originally applied for a court-ordered injunction forcing the homeless out of its parks at night. The homeless appealed arguing that the bylaws were invalid pursuant to section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[3] Section 7 reads:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The judge summarized the evidence placed before the courts:
The judge then identified the problem as follows:
In my view, the Defendants do not seek positive benefits in this action and it is therefore not necessary for the Court to consider whether s. 7 includes a positive right to the provision of shelter. The Defendants are not seeking to have the City compelled to provide the homeless with adequate shelter. Rather, the claim is that in the present circumstances, in which the number of homeless people exceeds available shelter space, it is a breach of s. 7 for the City to use its Bylaws to prohibit homeless people from taking steps to provide themselves with adequate shelter.[5]
The court did not go so far as to say that the homeless had a constitutional right to have shelters built for them. It did hold that if the City did not want the homeless sleeping in doorways or in its parks, it had to provide them with an alternate place to stay. Depriving people of a place to sleep was a breach of fundamental justice.
[1] Victoria (City) v. Adams, 2008 BCSC 1363 (CanLII),http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2008/2008bcsc1363/2008bcsc1363.html.
[2] Ibid. at para. 239.
(The Duty to Consult With Aboriginal Peoples)
The Alberta government has been licensing water usage since 1894. In the early 2000s, it realized that the number of licenses it was issuing was reaching the capacity of the southern rivers. The government developed a plan to equitably distribute water in the future. In Tsuu T'ina Nation v. Alberta (Environment), both the Tsuu T'ina and Samson Cree Nations sued the Alberta government, claiming that they had not been properly consulted in the process of developing the plan, as is required by the Canadian constitution.[1] The government replied that it had met that duty by issuing:
invitations to participate in the process by the government to the [Aboriginal peoples]. Meetings were held with the [Aboriginal peoples] to discuss water needs. The government hired a consultant to assist the [Aboriginal peoples] in their review of the proposed plan.[2]
The government also replied that the process of developing a plan or relevant governing legislation is not reviewable by the courts in any event. Both nations also asked the court for a clear declaration that they had a constitutional right to be consulted.
The Supreme Court has noted that the case law indicates four situations that could come into play:
The Court ruled that Sparrow did not apply. There, Mr. Sparrow, a treaty Indian, challenged a Fisheries Regulation after being charged with using an illegal fishing net. Mr. Sparrow argued that the regulations impinged on his established right to fish for sustenance. The Court held that Sparrow’s right to fish could be limited, as that right was shared by other Aboriginal groups and fishers. Both nations argued that they had a right to an unlimited water resource under their hunting rights described by treaties. No water rights were mentioned under the treaties.
While not wholly rejecting that argument in Tsuu T'ina Nation, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench treated it as one that should be settled at a trial, not under a motion to stop the government from proceeding with a plan for the future.[6] The court did comment that if a government had an ability to limit a fishing right, it should have a right to limit water distribution. Mikisew did not apply here as there was no anticipated government action. The disputed water plan was already in place and had been for some time.
The Haida case did not apply in Tsuu T'ina Nation either. In Haida, a government had awarded a timber harvesting license on property that the Haida were claiming under the land claims process in British Columbia. In Tsuu T'ina Nation, there might be an existing treaty right to a claim of water, but in Haida the treaty has been under negotiation.[7] The court advised both nations they would have to establish that right at trial.[8]
This case was unique in that both nations had not yet proven a claim to a water right in court. As noted above, the government had invited both nations to participate in the process and had provided them with an independent consult to help them assess their position. However, it is unclear if either nation partook in the process. Both nations argued that the province was obliged to approach them on a government-to-government constitutional basis, rather than as a senior government consulting a junior government on an advisory basis. The court ruled that the province had no duty to engage in constitutional consultations with either First Nation. Further the court declined to express an opinion if such a right existed in the constitution.[9]
Also, and noting that there was a water crisis brewing in Southern Alberta, the court let the government’s decisions in regard to water distribution stand, as the decisions could be modified later if the First Nations involved successfully litigated their points in the trial process.[10]
[1] Tsuu T'ina Nation v. Alberta (Environment)http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/2008/2008abqb547/2008abqb547.html., 2008 ABQB 547 (CanLII) .
[2] Ibid. at para. 102.
[3] R. v. Sparrow, 1990 CanLII 104 (S.C.C.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
[4] Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 (CanLII), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, 2005 SCC 69.
[5] Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 (CanLII), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73.
[6] Tsuu T'ina Nation v. Alberta (Environment), 2008 ABQB 547 (CanLII), http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/2008/2008abqb547/2008abqb547.html at para. 81.
[7] Ibid. at paras 111-18.
[8] Ibid. at para. 129.
[9] Ibid. at para. 144.
[10] Ibid. paras 152-55.
A New Brunswick court has struck down a section of a law mandating that its province’s Law Society disciplinary meetings be held in private.[1] The New Brunswick News Inc. challenged section 62(2) of the New Brunswick Law Society Act, which states:
All hearings of the Competence, Complaints and Discipline Committees shall be in private.[2]
The court ruled that the legislation, which prohibited open disciplinary hearings at the Law Society, violated the right to freedom of expression enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[3] The province was given until June 2009 to redraft the law.
Standing
In order to be able to challenge the legislation, the party challenging the law must be granted standing before the court. New Brunswick News Inc. applied for “public interest” standing to challenge the Law Society legislation. The test for public interest standing is found in the case: Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada.[4] The court found that New Brunswick News satisfied the following three criteria:[5]
1) “Is there a serious issue raised as to the invalidity of legislation in question?”
The court said the legal profession’s disciplinary process was a serious matter, which had important implications for how the public perceives the legal profession.[6]
2) “Has it been established that the plaintiff is directly affected by the legislation or if not does the plaintiff have a genuine interest in its validity?”
The court found that this question was also satisfied. The media is responsible for publicly broadcasting the disciplinary proceedings of lawyers, and thus has a genuine interest in invalidating the legislation which keeps such proceedings private.
3) “Is there another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the court?”
Finally, the court said that a media-group challenge to the law is the most effective way to bring the matter before the judiciary.
Thus, the test for standing was satisfied.
Open-court principle
The court then examined whether or not the “open court principle” applied to the law mandating private law-society disciplinary meetings. The open-court principle presumes that “the administration of justice thrives on exposure to light – and withers under a cloud of secrecy.”[7] The legitimacy of judicial or quasi-judicial hearings depends on both their internal integrity and on the perception of their transparency by the public. Such legitimacy can only be maintained by proceedings that are open to the media and the public. The court found that the open-court principle applied to law-society disciplinary proceedings.
Freedom of expression
The court found that the legislation violated the right to freedom of expression found in section 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 2(b) says that everyone has the right to:
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.
The court decided that the legislation in question prohibited freedom of expression by making disciplinary meetings private. The right of the press to freely communicate disciplinary proceedings was thus limited. It found that although the press could report on the outcome of a disciplinary meeting, the press was unable to attend the hearing, report on the happenings of the meeting, or analyze any of the evidence presented during proceedings. Thus, the court decided the legislation constituted an unconstitutional restriction on the right to freedom of expression.[8]
Section 1
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
The court said that “[t]he interests which the Law Society seeks to protect – things like solicitor-client privilege, confidential matters and the like – can be accomplished without having the negative effect of a total privacy ban on the proceedings of the discipline committee.”[10]
Delay
The Law Society asked the Court for a time-delay of its declaration that the legislation was unconstitutional. It wanted the time to ask the government to make legislative changes which would not only open up the Society’s proceedings, but also to protect the solicitor-client privilege of lawyers’ clients and other privacy rights. In determining whether or not the action striking down the legislation should be delayed, the court mainly considered a balancing test. The court weighed the negative effects of keeping the legislation against the consequences of its invalidation. The court found that on balance, the effects of the legislative invalidity should be delayed until June 30, 2009, in order to give the New Brunswick legislature time to draft revised legislation that complied with the Charter.
In Minister of Public Safety and Security (Formerly the Solicitor General), et al. v. Criminal Lawyers Association,[1]the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) recently allowed various interveners time to reply in this important case dealing with limits on the right to freedom of expression. The issue at stake is whether or not there is a right to freely obtain certain types of information from the government. It became an issue when a judge presiding over a new trial for several men convicted of first degree murder found that police were negligent in not disclosing and maintaining pertinent evidence. An internal Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) investigation found no evidence to support the judge’s claim. Subsequent to the OPP investigation, the Criminal Lawyers Association (CLA) applied to obtain records relating to the investigation under provincial privacy legislation.[2] Numerous tribunals denied the CLA requests.[3] The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the CLA, saying it violated the right to freedom of expression under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[4] A Supreme Court hearing of the appeal is expected on December 11, 2008.[5]
The commission of inquiry assigned to David Milgaard’s case released its report on September 26. In 1970, Milgaard was wrongfully convicted of the murder of Gail Miller and spent the next 23 years in prison. According to Justice Edward MacCallum, who headed the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of David Milgaard, ‘the criminal justice system failed David Milgaard.’ [1]
Reverse onus provisions and section 7 of the Charter
On May 16, 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) gave its decision in R. v. D.B.[1] The decision determined who should carry the burden of proving that a young person should be sentenced as an adult after a Charter of Rights and Freedoms review of the provisions of the federal Youth Criminal Justice Act(YCJA).[2] The S.C.C. ruled that the government should prove that young persons’ sentence should carry adult sentencing consequences after they had been found guilty of criminal acts. At the time section 72(2) of the YCJA required young persons to prove that they should not be sentenced as adults.[3]
D.B. had been in a fight with another youth. D.B. punched him to the ground and then continued to punch him into unconsciousness. The other youth died as a result. D.B. turned himself in and pled guilty to manslaughter. At sentencing, the judge noted that a large number of other reverse onus provisions had been rejected by multiple levels of court across Canada, stating:
There is no logical reason why it should not be the responsibility of the prosecutor who wants the court to impose an adult sentence, to bear the burden of convincing the court of his or her contentions in light of the elements provided for in subsection 72(1).[4]
The government appealed.
The Ontario Court of Appeal (O.C.A.) unanimously agreed with the trial judge, but expressed its own reasons for doing so, focusing on the constitutional principle of fundamental justice. The court noted that all of the parties to the appeal agreed that:
It is a principle of fundamental justice that young offenders should be dealt with separately and not as adults in recognition of their reduced maturity. Put another way, the system of criminal justice for young persons must be premised on treating them separately, and not as adults, because they are not yet adults.[5]
Canada has treated young persons separately in its criminal justice system for over a century, and governments have signed international treaty obligations to that effect. In this light, the court noted: “the principle is sufficiently precise to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person.”[6] All three factors combine to show that the presumption underlying sentencing for youths in the YCJA treats them as adults, which does not account for their reduced maturity. Accordingly, the O.C.A. determined that section 71(2) of the YCJA offended a principle of fundamental justice, being the right to liberty under section 7 of the Charter.
The O.C.A. found a second reason for agreeing with the trial judge. It pointed out that previous case law required the prosecution to prove that there were aggravating circumstances in crimes requiring the courts to hand down more severe sentences. The net effect of the YCJA was that automatic adult sentences for youths were built into the act. Those sentences were much harsher than young people would face under other sections of the YCJA. The court concluded that the legislation offended the Charter on this basis too, as there was unequal treatment for individuals (youths) within the same identifiable group (Canadians).[7] The government appealed again.
The S.C.C. issued a 5-4 split decision. The majority agreed with the appeal court’s decision and reasons.[8]
A minority of the S.C.C. disagreed for two reasons. First it admitted that while Canadian youths have been treated differently from adults for over one hundred years, the previous legislation governing young people’s behaviour had not always treated youth sentencing as different from adults.[9] The concept that sentencing for youths should be different than adults had only recently appeared in the YCJA. Second, the minority noted that youth sentences and adult sentences could overlap, thus there was no requirement in law that youths receive a sentence shorter than that of an adult.[10] Finally, the dissent acknowledged that a majority of Canadians disagree with the notion that youths should receive different sentences than adults.[11] Thus, while recognizing that two fundamental principle of justice are at stake in this case, the dissenters came to the conclusion that neither offended the Charter.