Supreme Court Strikes Down Portions of Employment Insurance Act

The Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) has ruled that two sections of the Employment Insurance Act in force in 2001, 2002, and 2005, respectively, are unconstitutional.[1] In Confédération des syndicats nationaux v. Canada (Attorney General) the Court held that insurance premiums were collected unlawfully.[2] The federal government was given one year to rectify the situation.

A Québec union had complained of two matters. First, the federal government had no business putting employment insurance premiums into its general (consolidated revenue) accounts. At the time of the complaint the insurance fund had a positive balance of $40 billion. The federal government used those funds to create new employment programs and to reduce its overall spending deficits. The union felt that the premiums should only be used to pay workers upon becoming unemployed, as that was what the program was designed to address. Second, the union complained that the rates at which the premiums were being set had been delegated to the federal cabinet (where there was no public debate as to how much they should be), as opposed to being set by Parliament in legislation (where the amount of the rates could be debated in public).[3]

The S.C.C. dismissed the first part of the union’s argument. It affirmed previous court decisions that Parliament had the sole ability to create and set tax rates.[4] It noted that in prior years the fund had run into deficits, which Parliament had topped up using general revenues (thereby ensuring workers’ access to payments when they were unemployed). There was nothing wrong with the government doing the reverse.[5]

The S.C.C. accepted a part of the union’s second argument. Section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867, reads:

“Bills for appropriating any Part of the Public Revenue, or for imposing any Tax or Impost, shall originate in the House of Commons.”[6]

In enacting sections 66.1 and 66.3 of the Employment Insurance Act, Parliament assigned the ability to set premium rates to both the Employment Insurance Commission and to cabinet without describing the relationship between the two. In practice the Employment Insurance Commission recommended new rates to cabinet, but cabinet set the rates. The S.C.C. noted that: “At the time Parliament delegated the power to collect employment insurance premiums to the Commission and the Governor General in Council [federal cabinet], the legislation contained no statement either that its purpose was to collect a tax or that Parliament’s taxing authority was being delegated to the Governor General in Council.”[7]

Previous case law decided by the S.C.C. allows governments to delegate specific taxing powers to specific taxing authorities. For example, provincial governments could allow local school boards to levy school taxes for the specific purpose of funding school systems, where the “structure of the tax, the tax base, and the principles for its imposition” were clearly defined.[8] However sections 66.1 and 66.3 of the Employment Insurance Act did not mention any of the three requirements above. Hence the sections did not comply with the Constitution, and were voided by the Court.

 


[1]Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23, sections 66.1 and 66.3.
[2]Confédération des syndicats nationaux v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 SCC 68.http://www.canlii.ca/en/ca/scc/doc/2008/2008scc68/2008scc68.html.
[3]Ibid. at paras. 1 – 7.
[4]Ibid. at paras. 16 – 39.
[5]Ibid. at paras. 40 –56.
[6]The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3, section 53.http://www.canlii.ca/en/ca/const/const1867.html#legislative.
[7]Supra note 2 at para 93.
[8] Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470, (2001), 196 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (2001), 144 O.A.C. 1, 2001 SCC 15 (CanLII). para 75.http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2001/2001scc15/2001scc15.html.

The Oilpatch, the Environment, and Constitutional Jurisdiction

Concern over the environmental impact of the Alberta oil sands has led to talks of trade bans in the United States, to attempts to place limits on bitumen exports by the Canadian federal government, and to constitutional questions over which order of government is responsible for trade and export of natural resources.

Background: U.S.-Canada Relations
 
The United States and Canada have one of the most significant trade partnerships in the world.[1] A significant portion of Canada-United States trade involves energy goods and services. Canada exports 1.96 million barrels of oil to the United States every day, with the majority of that amount coming straight from the oil sands in Alberta.[2] 13 percent of American oil imports come from Alberta. For a long time, oil prices were too low to make extraction from the Alberta oil sands lucrative, but recent increases in prices enticed companies to extract as much as 1.3 billion barrels a day from the resource (July 2008).[3]

Conventional oil and oil extracted from the oil sands vary significantly in the amount of energy used to produce one barrel. A barrel from the oil sands requires three times the energy of conventional oil to produce because the oil must first be removed from the tar-like bitumen in which it is saturated.[4] Nevertheless, the life cycle emissions of a barrel of oil sands oil, with an average of 597 kilograms of C02 released per barrel, is still comparable to Saudi Arabia (517 kg), Mexico (528 kg), Nigeria (541 kg), and Venezuela (582 kg).[5]

In addition to the environmental impact of the oil sands, concerns also stem from the significant deforestation associated with its extraction, and the amount of water required in the process. Indeed, over 2.7 billion cubic feet of water per year is required to clean the bitumen during the separation process.[6]

These environmental realities have raised concerns in the United States over the environmental impact of the oil sands, most recently during the 2008 presidential campaign.[7] Barack Obama and John McCain both took a stand against the purchase of oil from areas with relatively high pollution rates, such as the Alberta oil sands. This shared commitment was supported by one thousand mayors across the United States who agreed to reject oil from areas with high emissions rates.[8] As well, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California took it upon himself to sign an agreement to limit imports from regions with poor environmental records.[9] This evolution of United States energy policy suggests that Canada-United States oil trade may become limited due to environmental concerns.

In 2007, the Government of Alberta reacted by passing legislation — the first of its kind in North America — limiting greenhouse gas emissions produced by “large industrial facilities.”[10] Under the legislation’s plan $4.7 billion[11] will be invested in cleaning up the Athabasca oil sands, creating more fuel efficient public transportation, and improving carbon capture and storage technology.[12] Despite the intentions of this plan, critics suggest that this legislation will not quell concerns in the United States. In a report issued by the Alberta auditor general in October 2008, the Government of Alberta’s strategy lacks cohesion and could cost taxpayers several billion dollars without any guaranteed reduction in pollution.[13]

While the actions of the emerging Obama administration are unknown at this time, the United States will likely choose to continue trading with Alberta, considering its desire to curb dependence on Middle Eastern oil for national security reasons.[14] However, the long term forecast is somewhat more complicated.[15]President-elect Obama has stated his government intends to implement a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emissions, which may include “hard caps.”[16] Since this announcement, the Harper government has made a promise to implement a North American cap–and-trade system. Alberta has spoken out about the necessity of involving the provinces in the design of any such system, because the provinces have jurisdiction over natural resources, and shared jurisdiction over the environment. Prime Minister Harper has also committed to banning exports of bitumen to countries with lower carbon emissions standards than Canada’s.[17] While Alberta initially showed interest in selling its oil to countries with fewer regulations, Harper’s new plan means that Albertans may no longer be able to consider oil exports to countries such as China, and will likely have to meet the more stringent standards being set by the United States.[18] Alberta has spoken out against the proposed bitumen ban on the grounds that it infringes on provincial jurisdiction.

Since the global economic crisis, Alberta’s premier Ed Stelmach has admitted that Alberta oil has lost its competitive edge.[19] In order to get on board with climate change champions like California, the province has announced a “Renewable Fuels Standard” that would require gasoline to include 2 percent renewable content and 5 percent ethanol and diesel by the year 2010.[20]

Alberta-Canada Relations: The Constitutional Aspect of Harper’s Promise to Ban Exports to Countries with Higher Emissions Standards

When Stephen Harper made his election promise in September 2008 to restrict the export of raw bitumen, Albertans were surprised.[21] The tactic was said to keep oil companies in Alberta from avoiding Canadian emissions standards, while also encouraging the growth of the Canadian market.[22]

The nagging constitutional question is whether the federal government has jurisdiction over provincial trade of these oil resources.[23] Alberta owns natural resources in the province (section 92A, Constitution Act, 1867), while Parliament has jurisdiction over interprovincial and international trade and commerce (section 91(2), Constitution Act, 1867).[24] The environment, however, is an area of concurrent jurisdiction. Premier Stelmach and Prime Minister Harper have both suggested that their respective proposed environmental regulations trump those of the other order of government.[25] But Harper has reminded the public that the provinces would have to accept federal environmental targets because interprovincial matters fall under the authority of the federal government.[26]

The announcement on limiting bitumen exports has also made ripples amongst expert trade lawyers. Barry Appleton, a Toronto expert on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has said the policy is in conflict with Canadian obligations under that agreement.[27] Appleton argues that the government is not allowed to take protectionist measures if it is going to justify them on the basis of environmental protection.

 


[1] Anna Hopper, “A Crude Reality: Canada’s Oil Sands and Pollution” (2008) 30(3) Harvard International Review, online: <http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1788/>.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid. The price of oil has dropped significantly since July 2008.
[4] Ibid.
[5] T.J. McCann and Associates Ltd., “Typical Heavy Crude and Bitumen Derivative Greenhouse Gas Life Cycles in 2007” (Prepared for the Regional Infrastructure Working Group, 19 November 2001), online: <http://www.oilsands.cc/pdfs/GHG%20Life%20Cycle%20in%202007%20-%20Aug.%2012-08.pdf>. at 12
[6] Supra note 1.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Gillian Steward, “Harper ready to harmonize with U.S. on climate change” The Star (November 9, 2008).
[12] Supra note 1.
[13] Auditor General of Alberta, Report of the Auditor General of Alberta (October 2008), online: <http://www.oag.ab.ca/files/oag/Oct_2008_Report.pdf >.
[14] Supra note 1.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Supra note 11.
[17] Supra note 1.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Claudia Cattaneo, “Alberta gets real about oil” The National Post (12 December 2008).
[20] Ibid.
[21] Dave Cooper and Paula Simons, “Harper to limit bitumen exports” (27 September 2008).
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.

National Press Celebrates the Prospect of Police Investigations

Promoting hatred is a criminal offence under the hate propaganda sections of Canada’s Criminal Code (318 through 320.1).[1] Allegations made under those sections are investigated by police officers and prosecuted by Crown prosecutors. This means that guilt in those cases must be proven at a standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Complaints about discrimination can also be made to the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) under section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA).[2] Complaints about discrimination under theCanadian Human Rights Act must allege breaches of section 2 of that Act, which forbids:

discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted.[3]

Accusations of discrimination under the CHRA are interpreted on the civil standard of “reasonable probability.” The few cases of discrimination by a private citizen promoting hatred, decided by the CHRC, “almost all involved expression that is so extreme and hateful that it may be seen as advocating or justifying violence against the members of an identifiable group.”[4]

In December 2007, complaints were made under the CHRA against two national press reporters who were accused of promoting hatred. Members of an identifiable group, as defined by section two of the Act (see above), complained that they had been discriminated against. The CHRC ruled that there was no discrimination; however, the commission wondered whether it should be hearing complaints that private citizens were promoting hatred. Thus, the CHRC hired law professor Richard Moon to review the situation and present a report.[5] He came to the conclusion that the CHRC’s decisions had come to duplicate the provisions of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, Moon questioned why the CHRC was replicating the functions of a criminal court. He recommended that section 13 be removed from the CHRA.[6] His recommendations have not been implemented.

A number of editorial writers see this as a victory for freedom of the press with the result that journalists can shed the bureaucratic nightmare of answering to every complaint registered with the CHRC.[7] On the other hand, using the police and the criminal courts to deal with accusations promoting hatred, says Mark Freiman, a lawyer with Canadian Jewish Congress, “is a blunt tool…”[8]

 


[1] Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 318 - 320.1.
[2] Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 13.
[3] Ibid. at s. 2.
[4] Canadian Human Rights Commission, Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission Concerning Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Regulation of hate Speech on the Internet by Richard Moon (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2008).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid. at page 3.
[7] Rory Leishman, “Human rights commission stifles freedom of expression” London Free Press (3 December 2008) online: http://lfpress.ca/newsstand/News/Columnists/Leishman_Rory/2008/11/29/7574646-sun.html. Ezra Levant, “A victory for free speech” National Post (25 November 2008) online. “Criminal Code the most effective tool to control hate speech on the Net” Vancouver Sun (26 November 2008) online. “At last, common sense on free speech” The [Montreal] Gazette (26 November 2008) online.
[8] Mark Freiman, “When Free Speech Becomes Dangerous,” letter to the editor Globe and Mail (26 November 2008) online.

Japanese Canadian Internment During World War II

On June 13, 2008, the Energy and Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) was given Notice of a Constitutional Question filed by the Métis Nation of Alberta (“MNA”).[1] The question was raised pursuant to Section 12 of the Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act (“APJA”)[2] and was stated in the following terms:

Has the Crown discharged its duty to consult the MNA with respect to potential infringements of Aboriginal rights protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982[3] which may arise if Application No. 1490956 to the ERCB is granted approval for construction and operation of the proposed Fort Hills Sturgeon Upgrader and associated infrastructure in Sturgeon County?

Alberta Justice advised the ERCB that it would be challenging the Board’s jurisdiction to consider the constitutional question provided by the MNA at the public hearing in June of 2008. Alberta Justice argued that the Board’s jurisdiction over the matter was ousted when the MNA failed to comply with the 14-day notice requirements provided in the APJA. The MNA argued that the Board was not being asked to make a determination on Aboriginal rights or on whether a constitutional “duty to consult” exists. Rather, the group wished to defer proceedings on the proposal by Petro-Canada Oil Sands Inc. (PCOSI) until appropriate consultation could be engaged in and their status as interveners determined. The MNA asserted that the notice provisions within the APJA are discretionary when the question does not challenge the constitutional validity of legislation.

In order to support its assertion that notice requirements may be waived, the MNA referred to case law dealing with the notice provisions in the Judicature Act.[4] Alberta Justice rebutted the evidence presented by the MNA by stating that the requirements in the APJA are broader than the provisions in the Judicature Act.Section 10(d) of the APJA states that, “Notice of Constitutional Question means ‘any determination of any right under the Constitution of Canada or the Alberta Bill of Rights.’” Alberta Justice also found this language to be mandatory rather than discretionary in nature.

The company making the application, PCOSI, agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction. The company did not, however, wish to bar the participation of the MNA in proceedings altogether. PCOSI welcomed the MNA’s presence, as long as it did not raise questions of constitutional law.

The MNA also argued that some of its members would be entitled to participate in the proceeding because they were landowners living near the project. The MNA suggested that section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms[5] would be implicated in some of their claims. The Board noted that not enough information was provided explaining which rights would be asserted and how the members would be affected. Standing, the Board ruled, could not be determined on the basis of such limited information.

The Board found that it did not have jurisdiction because the MNA failed to administer proper notice. It did, however, allow the MNA to participate as a “discretionary participant” and to make a short submission following the arguments made by PCOSI and the registered interveners.


[1] Energy Resources Conservation Board, “Petro-Canada Oil Sands Inc. Application to Construct and Operate an Oil Sands Upgrader in Sturgeon County” (January 20, 2009), online.
[2] R.S.A. 2000, c. A-3.
[4] R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2.
[5] Supra note 3.

One Disability, One Airfare

On November 20, 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal in Air Canada et al. v. Canadian Transportation Agency et al.[1] The decision means that air carriers and airports must accommodate persons with disabilities, even if doing so requires the provision of an “extra” seat. The appeal was the result of a ruling made by the Canadian Transportation Agency in January 2008 requiring that both airports and air carriers make accommodations for people with the following disabilities:

  1. “those persons who are required, under the terms of the carriers’ tariff, to be accompanied by an Attendant;
  2. those persons who are disabled as a result of obesity; and
  3. those other persons who require additional seating for themselves to accommodate their disability to travel by air.”[2]
The airlines were directed to provide an “extra” seat (at no cost to the passenger) to those who need the assistance of an attendant, or who do not fit into a single aircraft seat. Airports were directed to develop plans to alert airlines of the decision. Both parties were given until January 10, 2009 to make plans to accomplish the directive.

 


[1] Supreme Court of Canada, “Air Canada et al. v. Canadian Transportation Agency et al.” http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/cms-sgd/dock-regi-eng.asp?32729.
[2] Canadian Transportation Agency, “Decision No. 6-AT-A-2008” (January 10, 2008) at para 25. http://www.cta-otc.gc.ca/rulings-decisions/decisions/2008/A/AT/6-AT-A-2008_e.html.

Dancer Claims Age Discrimination

An exotic dancer has filed a discrimination complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal. Kim Ouwroulis, 44, complained that the strip club she worked at fired her due to her age. She had worked there 4 years before being fired. Ms. Ouwroulis was told by the owner of the strip club that “they were going in a new direction with younger girls.”[1] She has since found work at a rival establishment.

Under the Ontario Human Rights Code, age discrimination is prohibited. Section 5(1) states that:

Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or disability.[2]

The complaintant has an uphill battle in winning her case. The owner will likely argue Ms. Ouwroulis was fired due to her physical appearance, not simply age. Physical appearance is not a protected ground of discrimination under the Code. If Ms. Ouwroulis succeeds with her complaint, she may be entitled to receive monetary “compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.”[3]

 


[1]CBC News, “Exotic Dancer files age discrimination complaint” CBC (3 November 2008).
[2] Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19.
[3]Ibid., at s. 46.1(1).

Aboriginal Bands Reach Land Settlement in Saskatchewan

Three First Nations in Saskatchewan have received land settlements amounting to approximately $80 million. The Cote, Keeseekose, and Key bands in Saskatchewan will receive $80 million from the federal government in exchange for lands taken from them by the government at the turn of the 19th century. 6 percent of the settlement deal will go towards negotiation and research costs. Each of the bands’ collective 5,000 off- and on-reserve members will receive approximately $1,500. The bulk of the settlement, however, will go to land purchases and other investments. Band leaders will travel among Aboriginal communities to gain ideas on how to invest the bulk of the settlement, including purchasing some of the original land taken from them.

The lands taken from the bands total 12,800 acres and are located in eastern Saskatchewan. The lands, known as the Pelly Haylands, were originally set aside by the federal government to be used as a reserve in 1893. However, they were taken from the bands in 1898 and 1905. In reaching the settlement, the federal government has admitted it breached a lawful obligation in taking away the lands. The payout would have likely occurred earlier, had there not been a recently dismissed lawsuit on the settlement. Currently, there are 70 outstanding First Nations land claims in Saskatchewan.

Sources

Jason Warick, “$80 million Saskatchewan land settlement goes to 3 native bands” Edmonton Journal (3 November 2008).

Canadian Press, “Three Sask. reserves celebrate land claim settlement worth $80 million” (6 November 2008).

“Fort Pelly Agency (Cote, Keeseekoose and Key First Nations) [Pelly Haylands]” Indian Claims Commission(11 October 2006).

Equalization Payment Changes – 2008

The federal government is seeking to slow down the growth of payments under Canada’s equalization program. Finance Minister Jim Flaherty recently stated that equalization has of late been growing at an unsustainable 15 percent per year, saying “We need to curtail the growth, limit the growth of equalization over time ... because it's not sustainable over time.”[1] Flaherty reiterated that the federal government is seeking to set caps on equalization payments and not change the formula for determining such payments. The growth of payments would be tied to the GDP growth of the province.[2]

The news comes at the same time as it was announced that Ontario will receive equalization payments as a “have not” province for the first time in the history of the equalization program.[3] Next year, Ontario is expected to receive $347 million of the $14 billion program.

Equalization is a federal government program, established in the 1950’s, which attempts to “equalize” disparities among provincial treasuries. The principles underlying the program are recognized in section 36(2) the Constitution Act, 1982. The program’s purpose is to maintain satisfactory levels of provincial government public services in poorer provinces. Provinces qualify for payments when they fall below a national standard of fiscal well being. Québec currently receives over $8 billion in payments. Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan, and for the first time Newfoundland and Labrador, are currently considered too wealthy to receive any equalization payments.

 


[2]Lee Greenberg, “Ontario officially a 'have-not', to get $337M in equalization”Ottawa Citizen (4 November 2008).

[3]Ibid.

Youth Criminal Justice and the Harper Government

The Youth Criminal Justice Act

In 1908, the Juvenile Delinquents Act determined that young people would be charged with “delinquency” rather than specific criminal offences.[1]Youth were treated much like adults under this regime. Judges based their discretionary sentencing decisions on the likelihood of rehabilitation.[2] In 1984, the Young Offenders Act (YOA) was introduced in order to allow youth to be charged with specific offences.[3] The change was intended to instill a greater sense of responsibility in young offenders. However, the new Act was also subject to wide-ranging criticism[4] for failing to give appropriate recognition to victims, for lacking coherent principles of youth justice in Canada, for failing to provide consistent and fair sentences, and for burdening the courts unnecessarily. These considerations were eventually taken into account by the federal government and in 2003, the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) came into force.[5] Its Declaration of Principles states that the main goals of the YCJA are to rehabilitate youth, to provide meaningful consequences and, thereby, to promote enduring protection of the public.

There are a number of important elements of the Act:[6]

The Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. D.B.[7]

In May 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that youth charged with serious offences will no longer bear the burden of having to prove that they should be sentenced as youth.[8] It will now be up to the Crown to prove that the youth ought to be sentenced as an adult.

The YCJA provides that a person, over the age of 14, can be sentenced either as an adult or a youth if they have committed a crime such as murder, aggravated sexual assault, or manslaughter.[9] The implications can be dramatic because the maximum youth sentence for first-degree murder is 10 years, while, for an adult, the sentence would be life with no possibility of parole for 25 years.[10]

The majority found that these provisions of the YCJA breach section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[11] Section 7 states:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.[12]

Justice Rosalie Abella, on behalf of a 5-4 majority, explained that it is a principle of fundamental justice that young people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability flowing from the fact that, “because of their age, they have heightened vulnerability, less maturity and a reduced capacity for moral judgment.”[13] The majority suggested that the international community’s support for this decision is evident in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.[14] The dissenting judges argued that there is no societal consensus that the presumption in question forms a principle of fundamental justice.[15]

The Court also struck down a provision that requires young offenders, who have been given adult sentences, to demonstrate that their identities should continue to be protected by a publication ban.[16] The publication ban, Justice Abella explained, is part of the sentence.[17] To remove it adds to the severity of the sentence because the degree of psychological and social pressure on the person escalates as a result. Since the onus is on the Crown to prove that an adult sentence is necessary, the majority argued that the Crown should have to prove that the publication ban, and the added stresses it brings, should be added to the sentence.[18]

On this point, the dissenting judgment also disagreed, saying that the conclusion arrived at by Parliament was a legitimate exercise in balancing competing societal interests.[19] The dissent also found that because the harm is not state induced, the Charter should not apply here. Justice Rothstein stated that, in the case at bar, “there is no state action: the stigma and labelling that may result from release of the young offender’s identity are a product of media coverage and society’s reaction to young offenders and to the crimes they commit.”[20]

Harper Government on Crime and Changes to the YCJA

Crime

In late September 2008, Stephen Harper announced that, if re-elected, his government would define 30 offences that could not result in house arrest.[21] These include serious property crimes, invading a home, trafficking of illicit substances, kidnapping and offences that involve weapons. Since the election, the Liberals, NDP and Bloc Québécois have worked hard to lessen the stringency of this key bill.[22] They agreed that sexual and violent offences could not be punishable through house arrest, but that car theft and breaking and entering should be.[23] In an attempt to assuage those who see them as “soft on crime,” the Liberals have adopted a new slogan to counter the Conservative’s monopoly on a “tough on crime”[24] agenda. For the Liberals, being “smart on crime” suggests making laws that avoid court challenges. However, they have also agreed to bring some other, less pivotal, bills into law.[25] One is in relation to existing DNA data banks of convicted offenders. Another deals with criminal court procedures. Somewhat more dramatically, the Liberals have agreed to speed up the introduction of street-racing legislation, and a bill that could raise the age of sexual consent from 14 to 16.

Despite the Supreme Court decision in May, Harper has pledged to overhaul the YCJA, allowing for adult sentences on some occasions and removing publication bans.[26] Additionally, he hopes to raise the maximum terms for youth sentences. Legal experts have suggested these proposals have already been shut down by the Supreme Court’s decision in May.[27] The fact that the Court struck down the requirement that the burden of proof is on youth to demonstrate that they should not be sentenced as adults suggests that automatic sentences, with no judicial discretion, would also be struck down.[28] Harper said Justice Department officials advised the proposal would not conflict with constitutional principles.[29]

Federalism

In the United States, criminal law is under state jurisdiction.[30] For instance, in Texas murder is punishable by death, but this is not the case in all states.[31] In Canada, however, criminal law falls under federal jurisdiction. Some have complained that the Harper government’s position on youth justice allows provinces too much control over criminal law matters, which adds a patch-work quality to the quilt of justice.[32]

In most of Canada, the new sentences would be applied to youth over the age of fourteen. However, the Harper strategy allows provinces to choose whether they would like to see a higher age threshold.[33] Harper’s communications director, Kory Teneycke, has referred to this strategy as contributing to the federal governments “open federalism”[34] agenda. The official tenets of open federalism for this government include:[35]

The catalyst for allowing discrepancies among provinces has been Québec’s interest in having the threshold set at 16 years of age.[36]

It should be noted that the Conservatives were not the first to consider differential sentencing rules among provinces.[37] In 2002, when the YCJA passed, the provinces were given the power to opt-out of the reverse-onus provisions. Two provinces, Québec and Newfoundland and Labrador, chose not to implement the reverse onus.

 


[1] CBC News, “Youth Criminal Justice Act: Changing the law on young criminals” CBC News (23 June 2006).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] R. v. D.B., 2008 SCC 25 (CanLII).

[8] Ibid. at para. 95.

[9] Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C., 2002, c. 1, s. 72(2), 61 and 62.

[10] Kirk Makin, “Crown on hook over sentencing youths” The Globe and Mail (16 May 2008).

[11] Supra note 7 at para. 95.

[12] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 7.

[13] Supra note 7 at para. 41.

[14] Ibid. at para. 60.

[15] Ibid. at para. 131.

[16] Ibid. at para. 95.

[17] Ibid. at para. 87.

[18] Ibid. at para. 94.

[19] Ibid. at para. 107.

[20] Ibid. at para. 178.

[21] “Harper sees crime issues as political winner” CTV.ca  (28 October 2008).

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Campbell Clark, Caroline Alphonso and Les Perreaux, “Harper pitches two-tier justice plan” The Globe and Mail (22 September 2008).

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Orillia Today Com, “Youth Crime” Orillia Today Com (30 September 2008).

[31] Ibid.

[32] The Globe and Mail, “Tougher Justice, Patchwork Nation” The Globe and Mail (23 September 2008).

[33] Supra note 21.

[34] Ibid.

[36] Supra note 21.

[37] Supra note 27.

Publication Ban Victory for Press

On October 30, 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal in Toronto Police Association v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.[1] In 2001, an RCMP-led Special Task Force began to investigate allegations made against certain members of the Toronto Police Service (TPS).[2] The task force obtained a number of search warrants and an authorization to set up a wire tap. The applications for the warrants and authorization contained the names of all of the officers to be investigated. Only one officer was charged as the result of the investigation.

All of the applications had been sealed by the court for a limited amount of time to allow the investigation to proceed. A “sealing order” is a direction from the courts that members of the public, including the media, cannot review those files until a certain date. Various news media applied to have the applications unsealed (made open to the public) on the expiry date. The Toronto Police Association asked that the applications be kept sealed, as there were officers named in the documents who had not faced charges. The news media organizations argued that the investigation was over and that they should be free to examine the documents and report on them. The media argued that their section 2(b) Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) rights were being breached. Section 2(b) reads:

2.    Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.

In an unreported decision, Justice Ian V.B. Nordheimer of the Superior Court of Justice dated August 20, 2007 ruled in favour of the media. The Police Association appealed. The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge, stating:

In the particular circumstances of this case, the application judge decided the public interest in open justice outweighed the privacy interests of the named officers. He applied the proper test. He also considered whether a publication ban was a reasonable alternative measure that could protect the officers’ privacy interest. He provided detailed reasons for his conclusion that the material should be unsealed and not subject to a publication ban. We are not persuaded that there is any basis for interfering with his decision.[3]

As a result the press will be free to review the files and report on their contents.

 


[1]Toronto Police Association v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Supreme Court of Canada, SCC Case information webpage. http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/cms-sgd/dock-regi-eng.asp?32685.
[2]Supreme Court of Canada , Judgments To Be Rendered In Leave Applications, Ottawa, 2008-10-27, case no. 4.
[3]The Toronto Police Association v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Sun Media (Toronto) Corporation, Ontario Court of Appeal, 2008 ONCA 297 (CanLII),http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2008/2008onca297/2008onca297.html.

Update: Supreme Court Hears Alberta Hutterite Case

The Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) heard arguments in Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, et al on October 12, 2008. A decision is pending. The case arose after the Alberta government changed its driver’s licence regulations to require that individuals have their photo appear on their licence. The Hutterites objected to the regulations on religious grounds, winning at both the trial and appeal levels.

The Homeless Can Tent Overnight in City Parks

On October 14, 2008 Judge Ross issued reasons for judgment in Victoria (City) v. Adams.[1] Homeless people had been setting up “tent cities” in Victoria’s city parks. In response, the City brought in bylaws which had the effect of banning overnight camping in those parks. People were allowed to sleep in the parks, but they could not shelter themselves. Judge Ross ruled that the bylaws were “of no force and effect insofar and only insofar as they apply to prevent homeless people from erecting temporary shelter.”[2]

The City had originally applied for a court-ordered injunction forcing the homeless out of its parks at night. The homeless appealed arguing that the bylaws were invalid pursuant to section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[3] Section 7 reads:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

The judge summarized the evidence placed before the courts:

The judge then identified the problem as follows:

In my view, the Defendants do not seek positive benefits in this action and it is therefore not necessary for the Court to consider whether s. 7 includes a positive right to the provision of shelter. The Defendants are not seeking to have the City compelled to provide the homeless with adequate shelter. Rather, the claim is that in the present circumstances, in which the number of homeless people exceeds available shelter space, it is a breach of s. 7 for the City to use its Bylaws to prohibit homeless people from taking steps to provide themselves with adequate shelter.[5]

The court did not go so far as to say that the homeless had a constitutional right to have shelters built for them. It did hold that if the City did not want the homeless sleeping in doorways or in its parks, it had to provide them with an alternate place to stay. Depriving people of a place to sleep was a breach of fundamental justice.

 


[1] Victoria (City) v. Adams, 2008 BCSC 1363 (CanLII),http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2008/2008bcsc1363/2008bcsc1363.html.

[2] Ibid. at para. 239.

[3] The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 7.

[4] Victoria (City)supra note 1 at para. 69.

[5] Ibid. at para. 119.

Update: Aboriginal Water Rights – Clarified or Muddied

(The Duty to Consult With Aboriginal Peoples)

The Alberta government has been licensing water usage since 1894. In the early 2000s, it realized that the number of licenses it was issuing was reaching the capacity of the southern rivers. The government developed a plan to equitably distribute water in the future. In Tsuu T'ina Nation v. Alberta (Environment), both the Tsuu T'ina and Samson Cree Nations sued the Alberta government, claiming that they had not been properly consulted in the process of developing the plan, as is required by the Canadian constitution.[1] The government replied that it had met that duty by issuing:

invitations to participate in the process by the government to the [Aboriginal peoples]. Meetings were held with the [Aboriginal peoples] to discuss water needs. The government hired a consultant to assist the [Aboriginal peoples] in their review of the proposed plan.[2]

The government also replied that the process of developing a plan or relevant governing legislation is not reviewable by the courts in any event. Both nations also asked the court for a clear declaration that they had a constitutional right to be consulted.

The Supreme Court has noted that the case law indicates four situations that could come into play:

The Court ruled that Sparrow did not apply. There, Mr. Sparrow, a treaty Indian, challenged a Fisheries Regulation after being charged with using an illegal fishing net. Mr. Sparrow argued that the regulations impinged on his established right to fish for sustenance. The Court held that Sparrow’s right to fish could be limited, as that right was shared by other Aboriginal groups and fishers. Both nations argued that they had a right to an unlimited water resource under their hunting rights described by treaties. No water rights were mentioned under the treaties.

While not wholly rejecting that argument in Tsuu T'ina Nation, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench treated it as one that should be settled at a trial, not under a motion to stop the government from proceeding with a plan for the future.[6] The court did comment that if a government had an ability to limit a fishing right, it should have a right to limit water distribution. Mikisew did not apply here as there was no anticipated government action. The disputed water plan was already in place and had been for some time.

The Haida case did not apply in Tsuu T'ina Nation either. In Haida, a government had awarded a timber harvesting license on property that the Haida were claiming under the land claims process in British Columbia. In Tsuu T'ina Nation, there might be an existing treaty right to a claim of water, but in Haida the treaty has been under negotiation.[7] The court advised both nations they would have to establish that right at trial.[8]

This case was unique in that both nations had not yet proven a claim to a water right in court. As noted above, the government had invited both nations to participate in the process and had provided them with an independent consult to help them assess their position. However, it is unclear if either nation partook in the process. Both nations argued that the province was obliged to approach them on a government-to-government constitutional basis, rather than as a senior government consulting a junior government on an advisory basis. The court ruled that the province had no duty to engage in constitutional consultations with either First Nation. Further the court declined to express an opinion if such a right existed in the constitution.[9]

Also, and noting that there was a water crisis brewing in Southern Alberta, the court let the government’s decisions in regard to water distribution stand, as the decisions could be modified later if the First Nations involved successfully litigated their points in the trial process.[10]


[1] Tsuu T'ina Nation v. Alberta (Environment)http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/2008/2008abqb547/2008abqb547.html., 2008 ABQB 547 (CanLII) .

[2] Ibid. at para. 102.

[3] R. v. Sparrow1990 CanLII 104 (S.C.C.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.

[4] Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage)2005 SCC 69 (CanLII), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, 2005 SCC 69.

[5] Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)2004 SCC 73 (CanLII), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73.

[6] Tsuu T'ina Nation v. Alberta (Environment), 2008 ABQB 547 (CanLII), http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/2008/2008abqb547/2008abqb547.html at para. 81.

[7] Ibid. at paras 111-18.

[8] Ibid. at para. 129.

[9] Ibid. at para. 144.

[10] Ibid. paras 152-55.

New Brunswick Court Opens up Lawyers' Discipline Hearings

A New Brunswick court has struck down a section of a law mandating that its province’s Law Society disciplinary meetings be held in private.[1] The New Brunswick News Inc. challenged section 62(2) of the New Brunswick Law Society Act, which states:

All hearings of the Competence, Complaints and Discipline Committees shall be in private.[2]

The court ruled that the legislation, which prohibited open disciplinary hearings at the Law Society, violated the right to freedom of expression enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[3] The province was given until June 2009 to redraft the law.

Standing

In order to be able to challenge the legislation, the party challenging the law must be granted standing before the court. New Brunswick News Inc. applied for “public interest” standing to challenge the Law Society legislation. The test for public interest standing is found in the case: Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada.[4] The court found that New Brunswick News satisfied the following three criteria:[5]

1)          “Is there a serious issue raised as to the invalidity of legislation in question?”

The court said the legal profession’s disciplinary process was a serious matter, which had important implications for how the public perceives the legal profession.[6]

2)         “Has it been established that the plaintiff is directly affected by the legislation or if not does the plaintiff have a genuine interest in its validity?”

The court found that this question was also satisfied. The media is responsible for publicly broadcasting the disciplinary proceedings of lawyers, and thus has a genuine interest in invalidating the legislation which keeps such proceedings private.

3)         “Is there another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the court?”

Finally, the court said that a media-group challenge to the law is the most effective way to bring the matter before the judiciary.

Thus, the test for standing was satisfied.

Open-court principle

The court then examined whether or not the “open court principle” applied to the law mandating private law-society disciplinary meetings. The open-court principle presumes that “the administration of justice thrives on exposure to light – and withers under a cloud of secrecy.”[7] The legitimacy of judicial or quasi-judicial hearings depends on both their internal integrity and on the perception of their transparency by the public. Such legitimacy can only be maintained by proceedings that are open to the media and the public. The court found that the open-court principle applied to law-society disciplinary proceedings.

Freedom of expression

The court found that the legislation violated the right to freedom of expression found in section 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 2(b) says that everyone has the right to:

freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.

The court decided that the legislation in question prohibited freedom of expression by making disciplinary meetings private. The right of the press to freely communicate disciplinary proceedings was thus limited. It found that although the press could report on the outcome of a disciplinary meeting, the press was unable to attend the hearing, report on the happenings of the meeting, or analyze any of the evidence presented during proceedings. Thus, the court decided the legislation constituted an unconstitutional restriction on the right to freedom of expression.[8]

Section 1

The court found that the legislation could not be justified under section 1[9] of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 1 reads:

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The court said that “[t]he interests which the Law Society seeks to protect – things like solicitor-client privilege, confidential matters and the like – can be accomplished without having the negative effect of a total privacy ban on the proceedings of the discipline committee.”[10]

Delay

The Law Society asked the Court for a time-delay of its declaration that the legislation was unconstitutional. It wanted the time to ask the government to make legislative changes which would not only open up the Society’s proceedings, but also to protect the solicitor-client privilege of lawyers’ clients and other privacy rights.  In determining whether or not the action striking down the legislation should be delayed, the court mainly considered a balancing test. The court weighed the negative effects of keeping the legislation against the consequences of its invalidation. The court found that on balance, the effects of the legislative invalidity should be delayed until June 30, 2009, in order to give the New Brunswick legislature time to draft revised legislation that complied with the Charter.

 


[1] Brunswick News Inc. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), 2008 NBQB 289.
[2] Law Society Act, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89.
[3] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to theCanada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 2(b).
[4] Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada[1992] 1 S.C.R. 236.
[5] Ibid. at para. 37.
[6] Brunswick Newssupra note 1 at para. 27.
[7] Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 at para. 1.
[8] Brunswick Newssupra note 1 at para. 54.
[9] See Terry Romaniuk, “The Oakes Test.”
[10] Brunswick Newssupra note 1 at para. 58.

SCC Allows Interveners for Key Freedom of Expression Case

In Minister of Public Safety and Security (Formerly the Solicitor General), et al. v. Criminal Lawyers Association,[1]the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) recently allowed various interveners time to reply in this important case dealing with limits on the right to freedom of expression. The issue at stake is whether or not there is a right to freely obtain certain types of information from the government. It became an issue when a judge presiding over a new trial for several men convicted of first degree murder found that police were negligent in not disclosing and maintaining pertinent evidence. An internal Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) investigation found no evidence to support the judge’s claim. Subsequent to the OPP investigation, the Criminal Lawyers Association (CLA) applied to obtain records relating to the investigation under provincial privacy legislation.[2] Numerous tribunals denied the CLA requests.[3] The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the CLA, saying it violated the right to freedom of expression under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[4] A Supreme Court hearing of the appeal is expected on December 11, 2008.[5]

 


[1] Leave granted November 29, 2007, on S.C.C. No. 32172.
[5] Supreme Court of Canada, Docket No. 32172.

Milgaard Commission Releases Final Report

The commission of inquiry assigned to David Milgaard’s case released its report on September 26. In 1970, Milgaard was wrongfully convicted of the murder of Gail Miller and spent the next 23 years in prison. According to Justice Edward MacCallum, who headed the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of David Milgaard, ‘the criminal justice system failed David Milgaard.’ [1]

In 1980, the police got a tip that could have resulted in David Milgaard’s release from jail.[2] If the police had followed the tip, police might have led to the real killer, Larry Fisher, well before Milgaard was released in 1992.  The 815-page report does not explain exactly why Milgaard was wrongfully convicted. Nevertheless, Justice MacCallum points to Art Roberts, a polygraph expert brought in from Calgary, as having perhaps pressured Milgaard’s friends Nichol John and Ron Wilson to lie during their examination by police. MacCallum did find, in his conclusion, that the police acted in “good faith” and that there was not malfeasance on their part.[3]

 

A contentious part of the inquiry is MacCallum’s depictions of Joyce Milgaard, David’s mother, who led a decade-long campaign to free him.[4] Specifically, Joyce Milgaard, as well as a team of lawyers, investigators and supporters, often provided “information to the media that turned out to be untrue.”[5]

 

Finally, the inquiry called for Parliament to create a new independent body with the goal of reviewing allegations of wrongful conviction. With the existence of such an agency, commissions of inquiry such as the $10 million commission led by Justice MacCallum, could have been avoided:

 

if significant public expenditure can be avoided by the establishment of a truly independent, transparent and effective investigative agency, it should be done.[6]

 

Additional Information:

 

Official Website of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of David Milgaard

 

Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of David Milgaard

 


[1]CBC News, “‘The Criminal Justice System Failed David Milgaard’: Inquiry’s Report” (26 September 2008)
[2]Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4]The Canadian Press, “Judge Rapped for Criticizing Milgaard’s Mom” (29 September 2008)
[5]Supra note 1.
[6]Ibid.

R. v. D.B.

Reverse onus provisions and section 7 of the Charter

On May 16, 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) gave its decision in R. v. D.B.[1] The decision determined who should carry the burden of proving that a young person should be sentenced as an adult after a Charter of Rights and Freedoms review of the provisions of the federal Youth Criminal Justice Act(YCJA).[2] The S.C.C. ruled that the government should prove that young persons’ sentence should carry adult sentencing consequences after they had been found guilty of criminal acts. At the time section 72(2) of the YCJA required young persons to prove that they should not be sentenced as adults.[3]

D.B. had been in a fight with another youth. D.B. punched him to the ground and then continued to punch him into unconsciousness. The other youth died as a result. D.B. turned himself in and pled guilty to manslaughter. At sentencing, the judge noted that a large number of other reverse onus provisions had been rejected by multiple levels of court across Canada, stating:

There is no logical reason why it should not be the responsibility of the prosecutor who wants the court to impose an adult sentence, to bear the burden of convincing the court of his or her contentions in light of the elements provided for in subsection 72(1).[4]

The government appealed.

The Ontario Court of Appeal (O.C.A.) unanimously agreed with the trial judge, but expressed its own reasons for doing so, focusing on the constitutional principle of fundamental justice. The court noted that all of the parties to the appeal agreed that:

It is a principle of fundamental justice that young offenders should be dealt with separately and not as adults in recognition of their reduced maturity. Put another way, the system of criminal justice for young persons must be premised on treating them separately, and not as adults, because they are not yet adults.[5]

Canada has treated young persons separately in its criminal justice system for over a century, and governments have signed international treaty obligations to that effect. In this light, the court noted: “the principle is sufficiently precise to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person.”[6] All three factors combine to show that the presumption underlying sentencing for youths in the YCJA treats them as adults, which does not account for their reduced maturity. Accordingly, the O.C.A. determined that section 71(2) of the YCJA offended a principle of fundamental justice, being the right to liberty under section 7 of the Charter.

The O.C.A. found a second reason for agreeing with the trial judge. It pointed out that previous case law required the prosecution to prove that there were aggravating circumstances in crimes requiring the courts to hand down more severe sentences. The net effect of the YCJA was that automatic adult sentences for youths were built into the act. Those sentences were much harsher than young people would face under other sections of the YCJA. The court concluded that the legislation offended the Charter on this basis too, as there was unequal treatment for individuals (youths) within the same identifiable group (Canadians).[7] The government appealed again.

The S.C.C. issued a 5-4 split decision. The majority agreed with the appeal court’s decision and reasons.[8]

A minority of the S.C.C. disagreed for two reasons. First it admitted that while Canadian youths have been treated differently from adults for over one hundred years, the previous legislation governing young people’s behaviour had not always treated youth sentencing as different from adults.[9] The concept that sentencing for youths should be different than adults had only recently appeared in the YCJA. Second, the minority noted that youth sentences and adult sentences could overlap, thus there was no requirement in law that youths receive a sentence shorter than that of an adult.[10] Finally, the dissent acknowledged that a majority of Canadians disagree with the notion that youths should receive different sentences than adults.[11] Thus, while recognizing that two fundamental principle of justice are at stake in this case, the dissenters came to the conclusion that neither offended the Charter.

[1]R. v. D.B., 2008 SCC 25 (CanLII), http://www.canlii.ca/en/ca/scc/doc/2008/2008scc25/2008scc25.html.
[2]The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11,
http://www.canlii.ca/en/ca/const/const1982.html.
[3]Youth Criminal Justice Act, Consolidated Statutes of Canada, S.C. 2002, c. 1, s72(2). (The Court also dealt with the issue of the ban on publication of youths’ names. That part of the decision is not dealt with here.)
[4]R. v. D.B., 2004 CanLII 34941 (ON S.C.), (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 605, (2004), 190 C.C.C. (3d) 383, (2004), 123 C.R.R. (2d) 182, http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2004/2004canlii34941/2004canlii34941.htmlat para. 12.
[5]R. v. D. B., 2006 CanLII 8871 (ON C.A.), (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 698, (2006), 206 C.C.C. (3d) 289, (2006), 140 C.R.R. (2d) 168, (2006), 37 C.R. (6th) 265, (2006), 208 O.A.C. 225,
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2006/2006canlii8871/2006canlii8871.htmlat para. 55.
[6] Ibid. at para. 59.
[7]Ibid. at para. 65.
[8]R. v. D.B., 2008 SCC 25 (CanLII),
http://www.canlii.ca/en/ca/scc/doc/2008/2008scc25/2008scc25.html, at paras 1-94.
[9]Ibid. at para. 134.
[10]Ibid. at para. 130.
[11]Ibid. at para. 131.